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Abstract: Traditional conceptualizations of argument usually include a ‘connecting premise’ or ‘warrant’ that
needs to be added by the analyst when missing from the original discourse. This paper provides an alternative to
adding such missing premises from a list of predefined argument schemes by using the framework of the Periodic
Table of Arguments (PTA). It describes the Argument Type Identification Procedure (ATIP) and explains how to
derive the so-called ‘lever’ of an argument from its identification.
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1. Introduction
The Periodic Table of Arguments (PTA) is a recently developed categorization of argument
that integrates the existing dialectical and rhetorical accounts of argument schemes, fallacies,
and other means of persuasion into a systematic and comprehensive whole (Wagemans 2016,
2019). Like any overview of argument types, the PTA can, in principle, be used to develop
methods for the production, the analysis, and the evaluation of argumentative discourse. So far,
it has primarily been used for analytical purposes.1
Different from many other approaches to argument categorization, the PTA takes an
argument to consist of one conclusion and one premise. In doing so, it excludes what is
traditionally called the ‘connecting premise’ or ‘warrant’ from being conceptualized as an
integrating part of an argument. One reason for doing that is to avoid an infinite regress
problem: if the link between the premise and the conclusion is added to the argument as a
premise, the link between that linking premise and the conclusion should also be added as a
premise, ad infinitum (see Wagemans 2014, pp. 15-17).
Another, perhaps even more important reason for working with this minimal
conceptualization of argument is to dissuade the analyst of argumentative discourse from
projecting into the discourse all kinds of preconceived ideas about what an argument should
consist of to be ‘correct’, ‘valid’, or ‘complete’ in any sense of the term. For such projection,
if not accounted for by explicit methodological considerations, invites the analyst to the
hermeneutic activity of ‘hineininterpretieren’. This is problematic because any crossing of the
border between providing a theoretically informed description and giving a subjective
reconstruction of the original discourse may interfere with the subsequent assessment of the
argument under scrutiny.
After having thus introduced a theoretical as well as a more practical reason for why
the PTA takes an argument to consist of one conclusion and one premise, I would like to briefly
indicate the consequences of this choice for applying the categorization for analytical purposes.
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The argument categorization framework of the PTA has been integrated into the linguistic representation
framework of Constructive Adpositional Grammars (CxAdGrams) (Gobbo and Wagemans 2019a, 2019b, 2019c;
Gobbo, Benini and Wagemans 2019) and it has been used for annotating argument schemes in natural discourse
(Visser and Wagemans 2018; Visser et al. 2018, 2019, 2020).
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I will do so by contrasting the general characteristics of its method for identifying arguments
in natural discourse with those of the traditional method.
Existing classifications of arguments developed within the field of argumentation
theory usually consist of a list of argument schemes, each of which has a predefined set of
characteristics.2 To determine the type of an argument found in natural discourse, this set of
characteristics is used as an ideal. The identification of the natural argument takes place by
comparing the ideal to the real, and in case discrepancies are found, by subsequently using the
ideal to reconstruct the real. In other words, the analyst uses the list of predefined argument
schemes to find what should have been expressed in the original discourse but for unconscious,
habitual, or strategic reasons has been expressed differently or remained completely absent
from the discourse and to “repair” or “reconstruct” it accordingly.
This traditional method raises several problems, which I will illustrate by imagining a
predefined argument scheme that consists of one conclusion and three premises – see Figure 1
– and an analyst who, in trying to match the elements of the scheme with the text under scrutiny,
found the conclusion and premise 2 in the original discourse but was not able to detect premise
1 in the original discourse (?) and found something that could be interpreted as an instantiation
of premise 3 but was formulated in a slightly different way (premise 3’).
predefined argument scheme
conclusion
premise 1
premise 2
premise 3

Figure 1.

original discourse
conclusion
?
premise 2
premise 3’

Abstract example of discrepancies between the ideal and the real

Should the analyst now add an instantiation of premise 1 as a missing premise to the original
discourse and correct the formulation of premise 3’ so as to achieve conformity with premise
3? How to justify such reconstruction? Which hermeneutic considerations or interpretation
rules allow the analyst to transform the original discourse to have it correspond with the
predefined set of characteristics of the argument scheme from the list? And how to choose
which of the argument schemes mentioned on the list is the most fitting one in the first place?
How many discrepancies are allowed for the analyst to conclude that the identification of the
argument type is still the right one? And even if there is only a minor discrepancy, why
wouldn’t it be just another type of argument, one that is not yet mentioned in the list?
These questions all point to the same problem of the traditional method of identifying
argument types, namely that it is based on a comparison between the ideal and the real. There
is a list of predefined types of argument and it is left to the analyst to compare the items on the
list to the argument in the original discourse. On the basis of mostly implicit criteria for
correspondence or similarity, the analyst then takes a subjective decision regarding the
identification of the argument type.
Different from such comparative approaches, the PTA takes a procedural approach to
argument type identification and evaluation. This means that there are explicit instructions as
to when, how and why the analyst should transform the original discourse. But it also means
that there are no ‘missing premises’ that have to be added to the discourse only to comply with
the arbitrary characteristics of some predefined argument scheme. This applies a fortiori to the
‘connecting premise’ that is meant to express the connection between premise and conclusion,
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See, e.g., Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), Hastings (1962), Schellens (1985), Kienpointner (1992), van
Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), and Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008).
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for that would not only give rise to the problems about the justification of the argument type
identification just described but also to the infinite regress problem described earlier.
Taking an argument to consist of one conclusion and one premise, however, also raises
an important question. If the PTA excludes what is traditionally called the ‘connecting premise’
or ‘missing premise’ from its conceptualization of argument, how can the categorization be
used to evaluate the quality of the connection between premise and conclusion? In this paper,
I aim to answer that question by explaining how to derive the so-called ‘argument lever’
(Wagemans 2019, p. 61) from the identification of the type of argument in terms of the
theoretical framework of the PTA.
The paper is structured as follows. First, in Section 2, I expound the relevant aspects of
the theoretical framework of the PTA, focusing on the role of the notions ‘argument form’ and
‘argument substance’ in the description of the characteristics of the types of argument. Next,
in Section 3, I explain how the analyst can use the Argument Type Identification Procedure
(ATIP) to provide the systematic name of any argument found in natural discourse. Then, in
Section 4, I illustrate through an example how the analyst can formulate the lever of such an
argument and use it to evaluate the quality of the connection between its premise and
conclusion. Finally, in Section 5, I summarize the most important findings and indicate
directions for further research.
2. Characteristics of natural arguments
When viewed from a purely linguistic perspective, an analyst who found an argument in a text
has found two statements and – on a lucky day – also a connector. As soon as the analyst labels
one of these statements as the ‘conclusion’ and the other as the ‘premise’, the perspective has
already shifted from linguistics to pragmatics. For labelling statements with their
argumentative function means to assume that one statement is doubted and the other is more
certain in the eyes of an addressee, as well as taking the latter statement to be put forward by
the arguer to establish or increase the acceptability of the former. These pragmatic insights are
reflected in a wide range of descriptions of argument varying from Quintilian’s classical
rhetorical definition of an argument as ‘the reason that, through things that are certain, provides
credibility to that what is dubious (ratio per ea, quae certa sunt, fidem dubiis adferens)
(Institutio oratoria 5, 10, 8 and 20)’ to van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s observation that the
arguer ‘acts on the assumption that others either doubt or might doubt the acceptability of his
standpoint’ and therefore that ‘the purpose of his discourse is to convince someone else of the
acceptability of his standpoint’ (1992, p. 14).3

Figure 2.

An argument viewed from a linguistic and pragmatic perspective

Apparently, and this is also clear from the above general definition of argument, the analyst is
only justified in calling a combination of statements an ‘argument’ and attributing the labels of
3

These quotations have been taken from a short survey of classical and contemporary definitions of argument
(see Wagemans 2019, pp. 58-60).
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‘conclusion’ and ‘premise’ to these statements if it can be shown that there is some kind of
leverage of acceptability going on from the premise to the conclusion. Now the big question to
answer here is the following: “How does this leverage of acceptability take place?” How is it
possible that the arguer, as soon as they assume the addressee to have some doubt concerning
the acceptability of a particular statement, can provide another statement that makes the
addressee accept the former? What is the underlying mechanism at work here?
Within the theoretical framework of the PTA, this question is answered by
hypothesizing the so-called ‘law of the common term’. This law states that the premise, in order
to fulfil its pragmatic aim of rendering the conclusion (more) acceptable, should share exactly
one common term with the conclusion. Expressed in mechanistic metaphoric, this common
term functions as the ‘fulcrum’ of the leverage of acceptability taking place within the
argument.
Assuming that a statement consists of a subject and a predicate, the law of the common
term yields two basic possibilities of argument forms. If the statements share the same subject,
the argument has the form ‘a is X, because a is Y’ and is characterized as a ‘predicate argument’
(abbreviated as ‘pre’). In this case, the subject (a) functions as the fulcrum of the argument. A
concrete example is Unauthorized downloading (a) is not theft (X), because unauthorized
downloading (a) does not deprive the original owner of the use of an object (Y), which has
unauthorized downloading (a) as its fulcrum.
The other basic possibility is when the common term is the predicate, which means the
argument has the form ‘a is X, because b is X’. In this case, the predicate (X) is the fulcrum.
Within the framework of the PTA, such arguments are called ‘subject arguments’ (abbreviated
as ‘sub’). An example is Cycling on the grass (a) is prohibited (X), because walking on the
grass (b) is prohibited (X), which has is prohibited (X) as its fulcrum.
In natural argumentative discourse, any statement can be expressed as a proposition or
as an assertion. The difference between the two modes of expression is that in the latter, the
arguer’s doxastic attitude regarding the statement is explicitly present in the discourse. The
statement The president is doing a great job, for example, is expressed as a proposition, while
the statement I believe that the president is doing a great job is expressed as an assertion. While
both statements contain the proposition the president is doing a great job, the assertion
additionally contains the doxastic attitude marker I believe that (see Figure 3).

Figure 3.

The same statement expressed as a proposition and as an assertion

Within the theoretical framework of the PTA, the distinction between propositions and
assertions is used to characterize arguments as ‘first-order arguments’ (abbreviated as ‘1’) or
‘second-order arguments’ (abbreviated as ‘2’). If the propositions of the statements share a
common subject or predicate, like in the examples above, the argument is characterized as a
‘first-order predicate argument’ (‘1 pre’) or ‘first-order subject argument’ (‘1 sub’)
respectively. If the statements have the proposition of the conclusion as their common element,
the argument has the form ‘q is T, because q is Z’, with ‘T’ standing for ‘true’, a standard
4

formulation of the doxastic attitude marker that may or may not have been expressed in the
actual discourse and can be added or substituted by the analyst. Such a ‘second-order predicate
argument’ (‘2 pre’) has the shared proposition (q) as its fulcrum. An example is We only use
10% of our brain (q) is true (T), because we only use 10% of our brain (q) is said by
Einstein (Z), which has we only use 10% of our brain (q) as its fulcrum. And finally, if the
statements contain entirely different propositions, they have the doxastic attitude marker as
their common element. Such arguments are called ‘second-order subject arguments’ (‘2 sub’)
and have the form ‘q is T, because r is T’. An example is He must have gone to the pub (q) is
true (T), because the interview is cancelled (r) is true (T), which has ‘is true’ (T) as its fulcrum.
To summarize, the PTA in describing the characteristics of natural argument
distinguishes between predicate and subject arguments as well as between first-order and
second-order arguments. These characteristics are taken together in the notion of ‘argument
form’, of which there are four: first-order predicate arguments (‘1 pre’) taking the form ‘a is X,
because a is Y’; first-order subject arguments (‘1 sub’) taking the form ‘a is X, because b is X’;
second-order subject arguments (‘2 sub’) taking the form ‘q is T, because r is T’; and secondorder predicate arguments (‘2 pre’) taking the form ‘q is T, because q is Z’. In the visualization
of the PTA, arguments that share the same form are situated in the same quadrant, as pictured
in Figure 4.

Figure 4.

The four quadrants of the PTA reflect the four basic argument forms

The third characteristic of arguments that constitutes the theoretical framework of the PTA is
the so-called ‘argument substance’, i.e., the specific combination of types of statements. This
characteristic is determined on the basis of a widely used typology of statements that is
developed in debate theory and distinguishes between statements of fact (F), statements of
value (V), and statements of policy (P). An argument can thus be said to substantiate one of
nine possible different combinations of types of statements, conventionally starting with the
type of statement expressed in the conclusion followed by that in the premise: PP, PV, PF, VP,
VV, VF, FP, FV, FF. The government should invest in jobs, because this will lead to economic
growth, for instance, can be characterized as a PF argument, since it combines a statement of
policy (P) in its conclusion with a statement of fact (F) in its premise.

5

As is clear from this exposition, the analyst, in order to identify the type of any natural
argument under scrutiny in terms of the PTA, should classify it in terms of the three constituents
of its theoretical framework, namely as (1) a first-order or second-order argument; (2) a
predicate or subject argument; and (3) as one out of nine possible combinations of types of
statements. The superposition of these three partial characterizations yields what is called the
‘systematic name’ of the argument. To illustrate this notion, Table 1 provides the systematic
names of the examples of arguments discussed above.

Table 1.

Systematic names of examples instantiating the four basic argument forms

Assuming these three constituents and the corresponding possibilities, the PTA distinguishes
between 2 x 2 x 9 = 36 systematic types of argument. While situating argument types that share
the same form in the same quadrant, the additional constituent of the argument substance is
added to the visualization of the PTA by horizontally distributing the combinations in the
systematic variation pictured in Figure 5.

Figure 5.

The framework of the PTA allows for 36 systematic types of argument
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3. The Argument Type Identification Procedure (ATIP)
As said above, the PTA does not include what is traditionally called a ‘connecting premise’ or
‘missing premise’ in its conceptualization of argument. Instead, the analyst using the PTA for
evaluative purposes derives what is called the ‘argument lever’ from the identification of the
argument. In this section, I describe how such identification takes place by presenting the most
recent version of the so-called ‘Argument Type Identification Procedure (ATIP)’, which is
developed to help the analyst to identify the type of any argument expressed in natural
language.4 The ATIP starts with a functional analysis of the elements of the two statements that
have been recognized as the ‘conclusion’ and the ‘premise’ of the argument under scrutiny and
results in labelling that argument with a systematic type indicator that summarizes its
characteristics. The procedure consists of several steps, which are explained below and
illustrated through an example.
Step 1 – Label the textual elements
The theoretical framework of the PTA takes an argument to consist of two connected
statements, one functioning as the ‘conclusion’ and the other as the ‘premise’ (Wagemans
2019, p. 60). To identify the type of argument, the analyst should first label its textual elements
based on their pragmatic function. The following labels are in use:
§ the text may contain a ‘connector’ such as because or therefore indicating the
function of the statements as ‘conclusion’ and ‘premise’ (for lists of such indicators
see, e.g., van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans 2007; Stab and
Gurevych 2017)
§ the statements usually contain a ‘subject’, i.e., an entity about which something is
said, and a ‘predicate’, i.e., what is said about that entity
§ the subject and predicate together form the ‘propositional content’ of the statement
§ apart from this propositional content, the statement may contain a ‘doxastic
commissive’ such as we believe that, it is true that, and in my humble opinion, which
are linguistic expressions of the arguer’s commitment regarding the acceptability of
the propositional content (Wagemans 2019, pp. 62-64)
§ the statement may also contain a ‘doxastic directive’ such as you should accept that,
which is a linguistic expression of the arguer’s goal of convincing the addressee of
the acceptability of the propositional content of the conclusion.
Example 1 – original text
Since the suspect left a long trace of rubber on the road, we believe that he was driving fast
Functional analysis of the elements of the statements
element
since
the suspect left a long trace of rubber on the road
the suspect
left a long trace of rubber on the road
we believe that
he was driving fast
he
was driving fast

4

function
connector
propositional content (premise)
subject (premise)
predicate (premise)
doxastic commissive (conclusion)
propositional content (conclusion)
subject (conclusion)
predicate (conclusion)

The version presented here is adapted from Wagemans (2020).
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Step 2 – Standardize the argument
The labelling of the elements of the argument enables the analyst to reformulate it in the
standard form “conclusion, because premise”, mentioning the subject and predicate of both.
Such standardization may involve several transformations of the original text:
§ regarding the statements
- reordering of the statements to reflect the standard form “conclusion, because
premise”
§ regarding the connector
- addition of the standard connector because between the conclusion and the
premise
- substitution of the original connector by the standard connector because
§ regarding the non-propositional elements of the statements
- hiding of the doxastic commissives and directives
§ regarding the propositional content of the statements
- anaphora resolution, i.e., the substitution of specific elements so that identical
entities are referred to by identical words (preferably the most informative ones)
- changing active to passive voice or the other way around in order to find a
common subject or predicate.
Example 1 – original text
Since the suspect left a long trace of rubber on the road, we believe that he was driving fast
Reformulations toward the standardized version
reformulation
We believe that he was driving fast, since the suspect left a long trace of
rubber on the road
We believe that he was driving fast, because the suspect left a long
trace of rubber on the road
He was driving fast, because the suspect left a long trace of rubber on
the road
The suspect was driving fast, because the suspect left a long trace of
rubber on the road

transformation
reordering of the statements
substitution of the connector
since by because
hiding of the doxastic
commissive we believe
substitution of he by the
suspect (anaphora resolution)

Step 3 – Determine the argument form
The ‘argument form’ is an abstract representation of the specific constellation of the subjects
and predicates expressed in the conclusion and the premise of the argument. Closely following
logical conventions, subjects are indicated with letters a, b, etc., predicates with letters X, Y,
etc. (predicates ‘⊤’ and ‘^’ expressing doxastic commitments ‘true’ and ‘false’), and complete
propositions with letters p, q, etc.
Within the theoretical framework of the PTA, four basic argument forms are distinguished,
which is reflected in the visual representation of the table as divided into four quadrants
(Wagemans 2019, pp. 64-67). Table 2 contains an overview of these forms, their names, and
the corresponding quadrant of the table:

8

Table 2.

Argument forms distinguished in the PTA

For completing this step in the procedure, the analyst can use the decision tree pictured in
Figure 6, which contains three heuristic questions as well as the corresponding instructions and
outcomes depending on the answers to these questions.

9

Figure 6.

Decision tree for determining the argument form
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Step 4 – Determine the argument substance
Apart from by its ‘argument form’, each type of argument distinguished within the theoretical
framework of the PTA is characterized by its ‘argument substance’ (Wagemans 2016, pp. 78). This notion is defined as the specific combination of types of statements the argument
instantiates. The labelling of the type of statement is done in accordance with a widely used
tripartite typology of statements developed within debate theory that consists of statements of
fact (F), statements of value (V), and statements of policy (P).
§ a statement of fact (F) is defined as a description of a particular state of affairs that
is or can be empirically observed in reality or that is or can be imagined to exist. In
order for the analyst to distinguish them from statements of value, it may be helpful
to consider the following subtypes and examples:
- empirical statements, such as ‘The suspect left a long trace of rubber on the
road’.
- existential statements, such as ‘God exists’
- predictions, such as ‘The economy will grow’
§ a statement of value (V) is defined as an evaluative judgment about a particular
entity based on a subjective selection and weighing of assessment criteria. In order
for the analyst to distinguish them from statements of fact, it may be helpful to
consider the following subtypes and examples:
- aesthetic judgments, such as ‘The Corrections is a great novel’
- moral or ethical judgments, such as ‘Circumcision is reprehensible’
- legal judgments, such as ‘Unauthorized copying is not theft’
- pragmatic judgments, such as ‘Our plan for reducing CO2-emission is feasible’
- logical judgments, such as ‘This proposition is true’
- hedonistic judgments, such as ‘Paragliding is fun’
§ a statement of policy (P), which is defined as a directive statement that expresses an
advice, an incitement, or an imperative. The analyst may recognize statements of
policy because of the presence of the term ‘should’ in combination with a verb
expressing a particular action. Examples are:
- advice, such as ‘Children should not sleep with artificial lighting’
- incitements, such as ‘You should go to the gym’
- imperatives, such as ‘Go to your room’
- proposals, such as ‘Let’s make the study of rhetoric great again’
By labelling both the conclusion and the premise of the argument in this way, the argument
substance can be determined as one of the nine possible combinations of types of statements
(FF, VF, PF, FV, VV, PV, FP, VP, PP).
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Step 5 – Provide the systematic name of the argument
The systematic name of an argument is a symbolic representation of the results of Step 3 and
4 of this procedure and thus contains information regarding the argument form and the
argument substance. It consists of:
- the prefix “1” or “2”, indicating a first-order or a second-order argument
- the infix “pre” or “sub”, indicating a predicate or subject argument
- the suffix “FF”, “VF”, etc., indicating the types of statements instantiated by the argument

4. Deriving the lever on different levels of abstraction
After having presented how the analyst can identify the type of argument by making use of the
Argument Type Identification Procedure (ATIP), I turn now explaining how they can
subsequently derive the argument lever from such identification. The lever of an argument is
an expression of its underlying mechanism, which explains how a statement can establish or
increase the acceptability of another statement. As such, the word ‘lever’ is taken from the
same source domain as the word ‘fulcrum’. While the fulcrum is defined as the term – i.e., the
subject or predicate – that the conclusion and the premise of the argument have in common,
the lever is defined as the relationship between the non-common terms (Wagemans 2019, p.
61).
As explained in the introduction, the procedural approach to argument type
identification differs from the comparative approach in that it does not work with a predefined
‘connecting premise’ or ‘warrant’ that the analyst has to add to the discourse in case it is
missing. Instead, it works with a flexible ‘lever’ that can be formulated on different levels of
abstraction depending on the availability for the analyst of information about (1) the
characteristics of the argument as obtained during the application of the ATIP and (2) the
discursive context in which the argument has been put forward. To illustrate this point, I now
provide progressively more concrete formulations of the lever of an example of natural
argument, namely the famous opening statement of Aristotle’s Metaphysica.5
Example 2
All human beings by nature desire to know. A sign of this is our liking for the senses; for even
apart from their usefulness we like them for themselves – especially the sense of sight, since
we choose seeing above practically all the others, not only as an aid to action, but also when
we have no intention of acting. The reason is that sight, more than any of the other senses, gives
us knowledge of things and clarifies many differences among them. (Aristotle, Metaphysica
980a21-27, translation Irwin and Fine, 1995)

5

For more example analyses, please see www.periodic-table-of-arguments.org.
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If the analyst only uses the information about the argument form, the formulation of the lever
will be a fairly abstract one. Following the ATIP, the argument in the beginning of this text can
be reconstructed as All human beings by nature desire to know, because all human beings have
a liking for the senses. This argument has the form ‘a is X, because a is Y’ and can therefore be
identified as a first-order predicate argument. The lever, being defined as the relationship
between the non-common terms, can then be formulated as the relationship between X and Y,
i.e., between by nature desire to know and have a liking for the senses. The abstract levers for
the different argument forms are specified in Table 3.

Table 3.

Abstract levers based on information about the argument form

To provide a more concrete formulation of the lever, the analyst can also take into account the
argument substance. Following the ATIP, the argument can be identified as an FF argument.
This means that the relationship between the predicates can be seen as a relationship between
two different factual properties attributed to the same subject. At this point, the analyst can use
the various ‘1 pre FF’ arguments already identified in the PTA as a heuristic. As pictured in
Figure 7, a visualization of the Alpha Quadrant hosting all the first-order predicate arguments,
the ‘1 pre FF’ arguments have levers formulated as ‘Y is a sign for X’, ‘Y is a cause of X’, ‘Y is
an effect of X’, and ‘Y is correlated with X’.

Figure 7.

The Alpha Quadrant of the Periodic Table of Arguments – Version 2.5

As mentioned above, to justify the choice of concrete lever that fits the argument under
scrutiny, the analyst can also refer to the discursive context in which the argument has been put
forward. In this case, Aristotle explicitly uses the term ‘sign’ to qualify the argumentative
relationship between the conclusion and premise, thereby giving the analyst an extra reason to
formulate the lever as have a liking for the senses is a sign for by nature desire to know.
Once the lever has been formulated, its solidity can be evaluated. Such evaluation can
reflect both the informal logic tradition of questioning the relevance and sufficiency of an
13

argument and the dialectical tradition of asking critical questions, some of which pertain to the
connection between the premise and the conclusion of the argument.6 In this case, to determine
the solidity of the lever, the evaluator should examine the extent to which have a liking for the
senses is a sign for by nature desire to know. Although the outcome of the evaluation is a
subjective judgement of the evaluator, by following the method just explained such judgment
pertains to an expression of the underlying mechanism of the argument that is systematically
derived from an identification of its type.
5. Conclusion
The argument categorization framework of the Periodic Table of Arguments (PTA) takes an
argument to consist of only two statements, one functioning as the premise and the other as the
conclusion, which means that it excludes from its conceptualization of argument the element
traditionally called the ‘connecting premise’ or ‘missing premise’. Given that this element is
one of the usual objects of evaluation of an argument, I addressed in this paper the question of
how the PTA can be used for evaluative purposes by explaining how the analyst can derive the
so-called ‘lever’ of an argument from an identification of its type.
The method, so I believe, has some advantages compared to traditional ways of
obtaining an expression of the connection between the premise and conclusion of an argument.
The first advantage concerns its procedural nature. Different from comparative methods, which
identify connecting premises based on a subjective comparison with a list of predefined
argument schemes, the lever is derived from a systematic analysis of the characteristics of the
argument as expressed in the original text. Following this procedural method not only makes
the analysis more transparent and robust but also prevents the analyst from reconstructing the
text based on preconceived ideas of what an argument should consist of and therefore from
running the risk of providing a biased evaluation of how the premise establishes or increases
the acceptability of the conclusion.
A second advantage of deriving the lever from the characteristics of the argument rather
than adding a predefined missing premise is that such a lever can be formulated on different
levels of concreteness, depending on the information the analyst has available. Based on the
argument form, the lever can be formulated more abstractly, for instance, as a relationship
between predicates. Bringing in additional information about the argument substance enables
the analyst to formulate the lever, for example, as a relationship between factual properties. If
there is textual evidence about how the arguer expresses the relationship between the noncommon terms, like in the case of the example argument taken from Aristotle’s Metaphysica
discussed above, the analyst can use the same keyword as the arguer to formulate the lever of
the argument. I think such cautiousness in providing a concrete formulation of the lever would
again prevent the analyst from engaging in the hermeneutical activity of ‘hineininterpretieren’.
Thirdly and finally, the development of a procedural instead of a comparative method
for argument identification and evaluation prepares the ground for a further formalization of
these activities, which is a necessary step for the subsequent development of computational
applications.7 As said above, the outcome of an assessment of the solidity of the lever of an
argument is a subjective judgment of the evaluator. And I doubt whether such judgment can
ever be given by an AI engine, if this would be desirable at all. But I also think that being aware
of the importance of humans having the last word about what they find acceptable does not
have to turn us into techno-repellent Luddites. On the contrary, it may well be the case that
6

See de Jong (2019) for a systematic description of the relationship between critical questions and argument
schemes.
7
A formal representation of the results of applying the ATIP to natural argumentative discourse that is suitable
for such computational applications can be found in Gobbo, Benini and Wagemans (2019).
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sufficiently formalized argumentation theoretical insights are crucial for developing
‘explainable AI’ (XAI) engines that can assist humans in performing vital tasks such as making
decisions based on facts and reasonable arguments.
The research presented in this paper is a first step in examining the connection between
the systematic names used in the theoretical framework of the PTA and the traditional names
of the types of arguments used in existing dialectical and rhetorical classifications of argument.
In several of the cases analyzed so far, the keyword used in the formulation of the lever is also
to be found in the traditional name. If the lever contains, for instance, the term ‘sign’ in order
to substantiate the relationship between the predicates, the corresponding traditional name of
the argument is ‘argument from sign’. Extensive research into these correspondences, I believe,
would greatly benefit the further systematization of argument description and classification,
which is something that motivated the development of the PTA in the first place.
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